SULLIVAN v. STATE. (Supreme Court of Arkansas. June 3, 1899.) CONFESSIONS. The owner of property stolen, and who is really the prosecutor, is a person in authority, within the principle that a confession obtained by an inducement held out by such a one is not admissible.
Appeal from circuit court, Greene county; Felix G. Taylor, Judge.
William Sullivan was convicted of larceny, and appeals. Reversed.
At the September term, 1895, of the Greene circuit court, the appellant, William Sullivan, was Indicted for grand larceny. At the spring term, 1S99, the cause came on for trial. Appellant, waiving formal arraignment, entered his plea of not guilty, was tried, convicted, and sentenced to one year In the penitentiary, and appealed to this court. The evidence upon which appellant was convicted, in part. Is as follows: B. A. Johnson, for the state: "Was acquainted with the appellant in May, 1895. About that time witness had fourteen or fifteen dollars' worth of meat stolen from him. Don't know of my own knowledge who took it. Other parties found the meat. I identified it by a wire that it was hung up by. This was in Greene county, Arkansas." O. M. Batey, for the state: "Was a justice of the peace In Greene county in 1895. At that time two men named Allen were tried before me for the larceny of some meat. William Sullivan testified before me that time. I made no promise to him to get him to make a statement. Sullivan testified that he and one of the Allen boys went to Col. Johnson's smoke house, and pried the hinges off the door, went in, and carried off a certain amount of meat; took it off a piece; met the other Allen boy there with a sack to help them carry It off. He said they took three (3) middlings and four (4) hams. I committed William Sullivan to jail. This was some time after. I made no promise of leniency to get him to testify. I was using him as a witness against the Allen boys. I did not bind him over for stealing the meat, but for stealing the clothes." The evidence of the witness as to Sullivan's testimony before him was objected to by appellant, and proper exceptions saved, and was excluded by the court, and the jury told not to consider it at all. B. A. Johnson, for the defense: "I had a talk with Sullivan about stealing the meat before he went on the stand at Esquire Batey's. He came to my house not a great while after the meat was taken, and I got after him, for I suspected that he knew about the parties. I thought he was young, and I could get him to tell about it. He told me finally, after working with him for some time, that he would let me know the next day. He said that he thought that the meat could be found. My recollection is that he went and had a conversation with his aunt, and he agreed to tell the story If we would agree to make it easy with him. I told him that I would make a state's witness of him, to help convict the others. At the examining court it was my understanding that he was not to be bound over; that, if we bound him over, the whole thing was gone. I think I told his aunt to go and see him, and we would try and make it as light on him as possible. It was our understanding that he would not be prosecuted If he would testify against the Allen boys. I was not holding any office In the county at that time, nor acting in any official capacity whatsoever. Sullivan confessed being with the Allen boys at the time they stole the meat. I simply told appellant that I would do all I could to make a state's witness of him against the Allen boys, if he would testify; that, if he would tell all he knew about it, that I would do what I could to make him a state's witness; that I would use my efforts to have that done." Defendant moved the court to exclude the testimony of B. A. Johnson In regard to the confession made to him. Motion overruled, and exceptions saved.
Crowley & Huddleston, for appellant Jeff Davis, Atty. Gen., and Chas. Jacobson, for the State.
---------COMMON SCHOOL DIST. NO. 13, GREENE
COUNTY, v. OAK GROVE SPECIAL
SCHOOL DIST. et al.
(Supreme Court of Arkansas. Feb. 19, 1912.)
1. Statutes (5 131*)—Conferring ProviSions Of Existing Law By Reference.
As Act May 31, 1909 (Acts 1909, No. 321), confers a new right on the people of any territory of a county, other than incorporated cities and towns, and not previously organized into such a district, of organizing themselves into single school districts, such portion thereof as makes applicable thereto the provisions of law in force as to such districts in cities and towns, and relates only to the method of procedure in effectuating the grant of power, does not contravene Const, art. 5, i 22, providing that no law shall be revised, amended, or the provisions thereof extended or conferred by reference to its title alone.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Statutes, Cent Dig. § 199; Dec. Dig. § 131.*]
2. Schools And School Districts (§ 22*)— Change Of Boundaries—Statutes.
Laws as to changing boundaries of common school districts are repealed by Act May 31, 1909 (Acts 1909, No. 321), authorizing the people of any territory in a county outside incorporated cities and towns to organize into a single school district, and by section 4 repealing all laws in conflict.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Schools and School Districts, Cent. Dig. § 41; Dec. Dig. § 22.*]
3. Schools And School Districts (§ 27*) —
Organization—Election.
Under Act May 31, 1909 (Acts 1909, No. 321) f 2, providing that, on petition for an election to organize territory into a special school district, the county judge shall appoint three qualified electors to hold the election, they are to ascertain and make known the result thereof; and, if a majority, as so ascertained, vote therefor, the district is established.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Schools and School Districts, Cent. Dig. § 45; Dec Dig. | 27.*]
Appeal from Circuit Court, Greene County; Frank Smith, Judge.
Suits between Common School District No. 13, Greene County, and Oak Grove Special School District and Directors. From adverse Judgments, the Common School District appeals. Affirmed.
Huddleston & Taylor, for appellant. Johnson & Burr, for appellees.
WOOD, J. 1. Act 321 of the General Assembly, approved May 31, 1909, Is as follows:
"An act to create special or single school districts In any county in the state of Arkansas, with same powers as are now granted to incorporated cities and towns for such purposes, and empowering the county Judge to call said election.
"Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the state of Arkansas:
"Section 1. That when the people of any given territory in any county in this state, other than Incorporated cities and towns, desire to avail themselves of the benefits of all laws of this state for the regulation of public schools in incorporated cities and towns, they may be organized into and establish as a single school district In the manner and with powers therein provided, with such modifications of said laws as are herein provided.
"Sec. 2. That the petitions provided for in section 7669 of Kirby's Digest of the laws of Arkansas shall be accompanied by a map showing the territory asked to be made into the special district and shall be presented to the county judge of the county containing such territory, who shall perform the duties imposed upon the mayor of cities and towns in said original act, and with like force and effect, and said county judge shall designate the time and place for holding the election provided for therein, and shall appoint three qualified electors of the proposed territory to hold said election.
"Sec. 3. That all school districts created under this act shall have the power to borrow money as any other special or single district, in cities or incorporated towns, when a majority of the legal electors vote for the same, at any annual school meeting.
"Sec. 4. All laws and parts of laws in conflict with this act are hereby repealed and this act be in force and effect from and after its passage."
Greene County, Arkansas, offers an excellent exDrainage ample of the progress be
Workining made in the Southern states in the reclamation of Arkansas. swamp land by drainage.
Five years ago when the county judge of Greene County authorized the formation of the first drainage district for the reclamation of swamp land in the county, a surging mob of protesting taxpayers, surrounded the court house, remonstrating against the levying of the tax, and threatening to lynch the Judge. Today there are thirteen drainage districts in the county, that will reclaim one-third of the area, and lands that a few years ago were not worth the taxes are now worth from $0 to $50 an acre, and are supporting splendid plantations. Adjacent counties in the state have also taken up the movement and drainage districts are being established which will reclaim millions of acres of land.
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APPEAL by plaintiff from a decree of the Chancery Court for Greene County dismissing a complaint filed to recover possession of certain land and quieting title in defendants in accordance with the relief demanded in their cross complaint. Reversed.
Statement by Wood, J.:
In 1885 H. H. Sitterding, Sr.. died, owning and occupying a certain lot in the town of Paragould, Greene county, Arkansas. He left a widow and two minor sons. George and Herman. The widow intermarried with one Thomas, and soon afterward moved to Oklahoma, taking her son George with her. Herman was sent to live with relatives in Indiana. On the 23d of January, 1892, the present guardian and curator of George and Herman, under orders of the probate court, leased the lot in controversy to appellees for a period of eleven years, for the sum of $300 per year. Under the terms of the lease, all the improvements made on the lot by appellees would remain personal property, and when the lease expired appellees were given the privilege of removing same. The appellees took possession under the lease and erected on the leased lot and on another lot adjoining, which they owned, a two-story brick business house, at an expense of between $9,000 and $10,000. .
On the 28th day of August, 1899, under the orders of the probate court, the guardian and curator executed another lease on the lot mentioned to appellees for a period of ten years, upon substantially the same terms as the former lease. Under the last lease, appellees were given six months from the expiration of the lease to sell or remove the improvements made thereon, and during such time they were to pay rent at the rate of $25 per month.
On the 3d day of May, 1904, the district court of the territory of Oklahoma rendered a judgment removing the disabilities of nonage of George and Herman Sitterding, specifically authorizing them to sell the lot mentioned above, which is described in the judgment. On the 5th day of May, 1904, a deed was executed by Emma Thomas (formerly Sitterding), George Sitterding, and Herman Sitterding, in which, for the consideration of $3,000, they did "grant, bargain, sell, and convey" unto Bertig Bros, (appellees) the lot, describing it, and covenanted with them to forever warrant and defend the title against all lawful claims. The deed was duly recorded in Greene county on June 6, 1904.
George Sitterding came of age July 30, 1905. Herman reached his majority March 15, 1907. On the 6th day of April, 1907, George and Herman Sitterding. for the consideration of $3,000, duly executed to appellant, D. G. Bcauchamp, a deed in which they did "grant, bargain, sell, and convey" unto Beauchamp, and unto his heirs and assigns forever, "all their right, title, and interest in and to" the lot mentioned above. The deed contained no specific covenants to warrant and defend the title.
On the 8th of June, 1907, appellant brought suit in the circuit court of Greene county against appellees for the lot in controversy, claiming the title and right to possession of same under his deed from George and Herman Sitterding, which he made an exhibit. The complaint, after describing the lot and deraigning the title thereto, alleged that the appellees were in possession of said property under and by virtue of the deed of conveyance executed by George Sitterding and H. H. Sitterding, Jr., on May 5, 1904, while the parties were minors; and it charged that they avoided and repudiated the same afterwards by executing a deed to appellant. It was alleged that appellant had tendered to appellees the sum of $1,720, the amount paid by them to the Sitterdings, which the appellees refused to accept: that appellees were liable to him for rentals on the lot in controversy for a period of three years and one month at tne rate of $100 per month. Appellant prayed judgment for possession, and for damages in the sum of $2,500, and for all proper relief.
The answer and cross complaint of appellees set up title to the lot sued for, under the deed from Emma Thomas and George and Herman Sitterding of May 5, 1904, denied that either of said heirs was under any disability when they executed .the deed, and denied that appellees only paid $1,720 for the lot, but alleged that they paid $4,100,— that is, $3,000 to the grantors themselves, and discharged their obligations for $1,100 more. The proceedings of the district court of Oklahoma were set forth in extenso, and the duly authenticated copy of that judgment was properly pleaded; and it was alleged that under that judgment George and Herman Sitterding had the power to make the deed under which appellees claimed the same as if they had been of full age, and that under the Constitution and the Revised Statutes of the United States full faith and credit must be. given to that judgment here. The terms of the lease were set forth, and the possession of appellees thereunder and the improvements made by them, and it was alleged that the appellant had notice of appellees' rights under the lease. The lease was pleaded in bar of appellant's right to recover possession of the premises. The cross complaint contained the further allegation "that on April 6, 1907, the plaintiff, well knowing the contract aforesaid and of the payment by defendants of the purchase money for said premises, for a consideration of $250, acquired from said George \V. Sitterding and H. H. Sitterding a deed of conveyance to said premises, which has been recorded in the office of said recorder of Greene county;" and they charged that whatever title he may have so acquired he held in trust for the defendants.
It was further averred that no dower had ever been assigned to said widow, Emma Thomas, and that by said conveyance she had assigned to them all of her dower rights in the said premises, and that they were the owners thereof. And they further averred that the premises consisted of a lot 50x100 feet, entirely covered by the two-story brick business house erected by defendants under said lease, and that it was indivisible, so as to carve out said dower interest without prejudice.
There was a further allegation that the plaintiff procured George W. Sitterding to join in the deed to plaintiff for the premises in controversy by representing to him that the plaintiff represented defendants and wanted said deed from him (the said Sitterding) in order to affirm and make valid the deed which he, Sitterding, had previously made to defendants, and that said Sitterding agreed, for the sum of $100 paid by plaintiff to him, to make a new deed affirming and ratifying his previous conveyance, and that he executed said deed to the plaintiff, with the intention and for the purpose of thereby confirming and ratifying the title previously conveyed to defendants.
They prayed that the deed from George Sitterding to plaintiff be taken as a confirmation and ratification of the previous conveyance made to defendants; also, that whatever title was acquired by plaintiff be decreed to belong to them and be devested out of him and vested in them, or, failing in this, that the said dower interest be adjudged to them, and that a lien be imposed upon said premises for the value of such improvements, or that the right to remove the improvements be otherwise protected; and for other relief.
The answer of appellant to the cross complaint of appellees contained allegations of fact to show that the district court of Oklahoma had no jurisdiction to render the judgment removing the disabilities of George and Herman Sitterding, and such jurisdiction was denied. Appellant denied that more than $1,720 was paid to the Sitterdings by appellees, denied that he held the title in trust for appellees, denied that the lease to appellees was of any value, or that appellees had the right to remove the building from the lot in controversy. He denied that appellant had procured the deed from George Sitterding by representing himself to be representing appellees for the purpose of procuring a deed affirming or making valid the deed previously made to appellees, denied that the deed was made by George Sitterding to appellant for the purpose of ratifying the deed made by George Sitterding to appellees, but alleged that George made the deed to appellant for the consideration of $125 paid him by appellant, and that he knew when he executed the deed tlmt it was not to confirm any previous deed. The appellant further denied "that he procured an execution of said deed for a consideration of $250, but says that the actual consideration for said execution was the money that the said Georgo W. Sitterding and Herman H. Sitterding had received from the defendants herein, together with the further sum of all the indebtedness that was probated against the estate of Herman H. Sitterding, Sr., and the further sum of $500."
The cause, on motion of appellees, was transferred to the chancery court and heard there upon the pleadings, exhibits, and depositions. The court dismissed the appellant's complaint and quieted the title in appellees. Appellant prosecutes this appeal. Further facts will be stated in the opinion.
Messrs. Hawthorne & Hawthorne for appellant.
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Wilson V. State.
Opinion delivered June 27, 1896.
Criminal Law—Venuh—Proof.—It is sufficient in a criminal case for the state to prove the venue by a preponderance of the evidence.
Appeal from Greene Circuit Court.
Felix G. Taylor, Judge.
STATEMENT BY THE COURT.
The appellant was indicted for assault and battery, alleged to have been committed in Greene county, was convicted, and appealed to this court. The evidence tends to show that the offense was committed on Lower White Oak Island, and that this island is in the St. Francis river, and that the river is the boundary between Craighead and Greene counties. Instructions were given by the court and excepted to by the defendant, but the giving of them was not made grounds of the motion for new trial. According to the rulings of this court, the exceptions were waived by failure to make them grounds of the motion for a new trial, and are not before us for consideration. The appellant asked the court to give to the jury the following instruction, to-wit: "Second. The jury are instructed that, before they can find the defendant guilty, they must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the crime, if any, was committed in Greene county, Arkansas." The court refused to give this instruction, to which the defendant excepted, filed a motion for a new trial, making the refusal to give this instruction a ground of his motion, which was overruled, whereupon he appealed to this court. There was conflict in the evidence, some of which tended to show the offense was committed in Greene as
county, while some of the evidence tended to show that it was committed in Craighead county. The appellant, pro se.
1. The court erred in refusing to instruct the jury to acquit unless they found from the evidence that the crime was committed in Greene county. The venue must be proved. 30 Ark. 41; 23 id. 156; 9 So. 652; 42 La. An. 316; 56 Ark. 242; 53 id. 46; 18 S. W. 923.
2. The fact that the first husband of the state's witness worked the road, etc., in Greene county creates no presumption that Lower White Oak Island is in Greene county. 17 S. W. 3.
3. There was no uncertainty as to venue. The crime, if any, was committed in Craighead county. 54 Ark. 371.
E. B. Kinsworthy, Attorney General, for appellee.
The island is in the St. Francis river, which is the line between Greene and Craighead counties. It has not been surveyed, nor the line established. The boundary is thus uncertain, and the venue may be laid in either county. Sand. & H. Dig., sec. 1938. This section is not unconstitutional. 23 Ark. 156; 54 id. 371. When a river is the boundary, the criminal jurisdiction of each county shall embrace offenses committed on the river or any island thereof. Sand. & H. Dig., sec. 1943; 35 Iowa, 199; 46 Mo. 350.