Chapter 11, History of the 85th Illinois Regiment Volunteer Infantry

History of the 85th Illinois Regiment
Illinois Volunteer Infantry
by
Henry J. Aten

CHAPTER XI
Pages 109-123

September 1863 - October 1863

   On the afternoon of the 23rd, General Steedman’s division moved to the north side of the river, and a line was established, in which each brigade occupied a detached camp. The First brigade on Moccasin Point, opposite the north end of Lookout mountain; the Second brigade on Stringer’s ridge, opposite the city, while to Colonel McCook and his brigade a camp was assigned at Friar’s Ford, some six miles above the city. The camp of the Eighty-fifth was a quarter of a mile from the river, facing the ford, which was opposite the north end of Mission Ridge, on which the right of the rebel line of investment rested. The ridge, as well as the narrow valley between it and the river, was covered with heavy timber. Pickets were posted on the river bank in front of the camp, which was in full view from the other shore, while the timber concealed the movements of the enemy and invested the opposite side of the river with the interest which always attaches to the unknown. Far in the rear of the camp rose Wallen’s Ridge, with its picturesque palisades. The men were now on half rations, their clothing was worn thin and they were entirely without tents. But timber was abundant and convenient in the rear of the camp, and very soon the men built for each mess a small, but comfortable cabin.
   The only road left open to the rear was that over Wallen’s Ridge, and down the Sequatchie valley to Bridgeport, a distance of sixty miles. To supply an army of forty thousand men over this route in fair weather and with teams in good condition was barely possible. But on the first of October the rainy season set in, the streams, small and insignificant in the dry season, became raging torrents, while the incessant hauling rendered the road almost impassable. Our trains were frequently attacked by the cavalry of the enemy and hundreds of wagons were captured and burned. The faithful mules were pressed beyond endurance and became exhausted by hard driving and lack of forage, and each successive trip consumed a longer period of time. Not only that, but each trip reduced the number of wagons and the weight of their contents. Hundreds of mules died from hard usage and starvation, until it was said with but little exaggeration that the road from Chattanooga to Bridgeport was, when the siege ended, "walled in with dead mules." At each succeeding issue the rations were reduced, until goaded on by the desperation of hunger, the men robbed the horses and mules of the scanty pittance of corn given them, and parched and ate it.
   Over in the city the conditions were even worse than with the troops outside. There the thinly clad men not only suffered from hunger, but also from the scarcity of fuel. At first they used the smaller branches of the trees found within the lines, and such portions of the trunk as could be easily made into firewood. Later they were glad to work up and use the tough and knotty parts, and then when these had been consumed they attacked the stumps, and finally they dug the roots and carefully gathered and used them even to the smallest chip and fragment. Yet the men were by no means discouraged, each had an abiding faith that help would come from some source, and they were determined to succeed in driving the exultant enemy from his strongholds in their front. During the siege the battle of Chickamauga was much discussed, and as the men reviewed the bloody struggle they found much to criticize. To one and all the battle had been far from satisfactory, and without unduly blaming the commanding general, they became almost unanimous in the opinion that that army should have been concentrated, communications firmly established with Chattanooga as a base, and abundant supplies accumulated before a farther advance was attempted. It was obvious to all on the evening of the first day’s battle that a renewal of the conflict was inevitable. As the battle was not renewed until nine o’clock on the morning of the second day, the men could not understand why the right wing, during the intervening time, had not been closed down and firmly connected with the left. This would have obviated the necessity of moving troops in that direction after the battle opened, and prevented a movement which resulted in hurling regiments and brigades successively against the compact masses of the enemy, only to be broken and swept from the field. The officers and men who entertained these opinions were veteran soldiers, whose gallant conduct at Shiloh, Perryville and Murfreesboro had been such as to render probable their claim that if the right of the army had been retired during the night following the first day’s fight to a position as strong for defense as that selected by General Thomas for the left wing, they could and would have repulsed any assault the enemy could possibly have made.
   Long years have passed since the field of Chickamauga was baptized into immortality. Then it was a dense forest, with here and there a small clearing and rude cabin. Now it is a national park, in which the positions occupied by the contending forces are accurately marked by tablets, and monuments erected to the memory of heroes slain in battle. Owing to the timber and underbrush, comparatively little could be seen of the deadly struggle by the general officers, much less by line officers or enlisted men, except of their immediate surroundings. Divisions, brigades, and even regiments at times became detached and had engagements that seemed wholly their own. And in the end, for bold attack, firm defense and desperate fighting, the battle of Chickamauga became by far the most sanguinary conflict of the West.
   The best authorities differ widely in estimating the results of the battle of Chickamauga, general officers have grown angry in discussing it, and often disagree as to the location and work accomplished by their commands. The Confederate general, Hindman, says in his official report that he had "never known Federal troops to fight so well, and that he never saw Confederate troops fight better." The largest number of troops Rosecrans had on the field during the two days’ fighting was 55,000 effective men, out of which his total loss amounted to 16,336. During the battle, when his entire five corps were engaged, Bragg had about 70,000 troops in line, but the rebel commander made no detailed statement of his losses in killed or wounded, contenting himself with the blunt statement in his official report that he lost two-fifths of his army. It was a frightful loss, for which no real benefits were obtained.*

*Of the results of the battle, the Confederate historian, Pollard, says: "Chickamauga had conferred a brilliant glory upon our arms, but little else. Rosecrans still held the prize, Chattanooga, and with it the possession of East Tennessee. Two-thirds of our niter-beds were in that region and a large part of the coal supplied our foundries. It was one of the strongest countries in the world, so full of lofty mountains that it had been called, not unaptly, the Switzerland of America. As the possession of Switzerland opened the door to the invasion of Italy, Germany and France, so the possession of East Tennessee gave easy access to Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia and Alabama."

On the 30th occurred an explosion of ammunition piled up on the hill at Bridgeport, in which a number of men belonging to the First brigade were killed and wounded. Finding but little in the official reports concerning this unfortunate affair, the writer addressed an inquiry to Noble L. Prentis, a member of the Sixteenth Illinois, the regiment supposed to have suffered most in the accident, which elicited the following reply:

Kansas City, March 17th, 1900
   My Dear Aten: I saw the explosion of which you write me. I was midway of the regiment, and the ordnance was piled up just beyond Company K, the right company, and between their quarters and a little square earthwork with a ditch around it. On the side of the pile of boxes of ammunition, etc., was the regimental field hospital. There was a flame like a volcano, and a tremendous roar, then a shroud of smoke, and the whole air was full of flying fragments. The men said this was caused by two barrels of loose powder which went up first.* Then the pile of boxes kept burning, and there were constant explosions, sometimes of fixed ammunition and sometimes of cartridges, that lasted for hours. I went up to the place and saw the dead mules of the wagon that was either loading or unloading at the pile; the tents of Company K, "pup tents," were burning, and the field hospital tent was burning. I helped get the people out of the tent and into the ditch of the redoubt I have spoken of, and under a sort of sally port, where falling fragments could not reach them. I remember a horse had got into the ditch and when an explosion occurred he would shiver all over, and we had to drive him back when he tried to get under the platform where the sick people were. There were people killed, and the history of our regiment, Sixteenth Illinois Volunteer Infantry, in the adjutant general’s report, (Illinois) says fourteen were killed and wounded, but I have been entirely through the roll of the regiment in the report and cannot find a man set down as killed or wounded at that time.**
   The ammunition pile was a regular fixture there, and the men made it a lounging place, and there was usually a crowd, but as I remember, the Eleventh corps people commenced arriving at the depot that day, and our folks went down to look at the "Yankees," as they called them.
   I do not know who the fourteen were. From the report it might be inferred they were all our people.
   As ever yours,
   NOBLE L. PRENTIS

* W. R. Part III, Vol. XXX, page 947, says, "Careless handling of box percussion shell."
** W. R. Part IV, Vol. XXX, page 19, gives, "7 killed and 12 wounded."

Following Chickamauga there was a reorganization of the army in and around Chattanooga. The Twentieth, Twenty-first, and reserve corps were broken up, and the troops of which they were composed were formed into a new army corps, designated the Fourth, or added to the Fourteenth corps, which, with the Eleventh and Twelfth corps from the Army of the Potomac, were officially designated the Army of the Cumberland. In the new organization the Second brigade, to which the Eighty-fifth was still attached, was most fortunate, the Second brigade of the First, and the First and Second brigades of the Second division of the reserve corps forming the Second division of the Fourteenth corps. Additional regiments were added to the brigade, and Brigadier General Jefferson C. Davis was assigned to the command of the division, the corps being commanded by Major General George H. Thomas. This division remained as then organized until the close of the war and was composed of the following commands:

SECOND DIVISION
Brigadier General Jefferson C. Davis, Commanding

FIRST BRIGADE
Brigadier General James D. Morgan, Commanding
Tenth Illinois Infantry – Colonel John Tilson
Sixteenth Illinois Infantry – Colonel Robert F. Smith
Sixtieth Illinois Infantry – Colonel W. B. Anderson
Tenth Michigan Infantry – Colonel C. J. Dickerson
Fourteenth Michigan Infantry – Colonel H. K. Mizner

SECOND BRIGADE
Brigadier General John Beatty, Commanding
Ninety-eighth Ohio Infantry – Colonel James M. Shane
108th Ohio Infantry – Major Joseph Good
113th Ohio Infantry – Colonel J. G Mitchell
121st Ohio Infantry – Major John Yager
Thirty-fourth Illinois Infantry – Lieutenant Col. Oscar Van Tassel
Seventy-eighth Illinois Infantry – Colonel Carter Van Vleck

THIRD BRIGADE
Colonel Daniel McCook, Commanding
Fifty-second Ohio Infantry – Lieut. Col. Charles W. Clancy
Eighty-fifth Illinois Infantry – Colonel Caleb Dilworth
Eighty-sixth Illinois Infantry – Lieut. Col. David W. Magee
125th Illinois Infantry – Colonel Oscar F. Harmon
110th Illinois Infantry – Lieut. Col. E. H. Topping
Twenty-second Indiana Infantry – Colonel W. M. Wiles

ARTILLERY
Second Minnesota Battery – Lieutenant Richard L. Dawley
Fifth Wisconsin Battery – Captain George Q. Gardner
Battery I, Second Illinois – Captain Charles M. Barnett

   Until late in the month the Third brigade patrolled the north bank of the river from Chattanooga to Dallas, a distance of fourteen miles, which necessitated heavy details for patrol duty. The trains sent far into the country to procure forage for the animals required strong guards for their protection, and the men were kept exceedingly busy. Toward the last of the month the First brigade arrived from Bridgeport, and was stationed at Dallas, which afforded some relief to the overworked and underfed troops. But notwithstanding the short rations, lack of clothing and blankets, the continuous exposure, the constant danger, and the anxiety sometimes felt if not expressed lest retreat might become necessary, and disaster to the army and the cause result, the men were cheerful and uttered few complaints.
   Throughout the summer campaigns there had been an evident lack of cooperation in the movements of the three armies, whose fields of operations were penetrated by the Tennessee river. True the Army of the Tennessee had won a most brilliant and satisfactory success in the capture of Vicksburg, but the end of the summer found the Army of the Cumberland on the defensive at Chattanooga, an the Army of the Ohio occupying a like unsatisfactory position at Knoxville. In order to secure intimate cooperation between these three armies in the future, the military division of the Mississippi was created by the President, and General Grant assigned to its command. This order of the President placed General Thomas in command of the Army of the Cumberland, and on the 20th he assumed command formally, and General Rosecrans left for Cincinnati before it was generally known that he had been relieved.
   General Rosecrans was one of the most successful generals of the Civil War, and perhaps the most brilliant strategist. He was a scholar, a philosopher, an eminent engineer, and a religious enthusiast. When the war broke out he gave his whole soul to it, and with one exception he was victorious in every battle. In the early campaigns in West Virginia he beat General Lee in battle, and out-generaled him with his strategy. At Iuka, Corinth and Stone River his splendid dash along the firing line aroused his troops to an enthusiasm which won. His personal daring everywhere raised the spirit that flamed into victory, but through a contingency that could not be foreseen, disaster overtook the right wing of his army in Chickamauga, and he was caught and forced with it off the field. Deceived by the treachery of his chief of staff, who was even then intriguing for the position of his chief, he rode into Chattanooga. There he was helped out of his saddle and assisted into department headquarters, broken in body and spirit. It was the turning point in a successful career, and his hour had come.
   The appointment of General Thomas was hailed with delight by the entire army. Officers and men recognized in this appointment a fitting reward for his eminent service, uniform success and unselfish devotion to his country’s cause. In rain and mud and cold, among the rough hills and tangled woods, on the banks of the Cumberland river in January, 1862, General Thomas fought the battle of Mill Springs. The enemy was routed, his general killed and his battle flags captured. It was the first decisive victory for the Union arms in the west, and was rich in spoil of the battlefield. Twelve pieces of artillery, 150 wagons, 1,000 head of horses and mules, and 392 killed and captured of the enemy, attest the completeness of his victory. At Murfreesboro when the right of the army had been routed, it was the center under Thomas that repelled the assaults of the eager enemy, although assailed with fierceness and tenacity unsurpassed in the annals of war. And it was Thomas, calm and self-reliant in emergencies, stubborn in defense, and masterful in resources that met the crisis at Chickamauga and wrought out deliverance for our imperiled army. Indeed, the logic of the situation so strongly pointed to Thomas as the future commander of the Army of the Cumberland, that a rumor to that effect had been current in the camps from the time the army retired to Chattanooga.
   In the meantime, the men had seen their rations reduced to one-half, one-third and one-fourth, but all recognized the necessity for this and no one felt willing to abandon Chattanooga, while the rebel flag floated in full view from Lookout mountain and Mission ridge. The dispatch from General Thomas to General Grant, in which he said, "We will hold Chattanooga till we starve" not only expressed his own purpose but the determination of his men. It was an heroic message, backed by inflexible faith, and invincible arms. The men felt that they had been forced to fight at Chickamauga under adverse circumstances, against superior numbers, and under conditions which rendered success impossible, but in leaving that field there had been no panic, and officers and men were alike eager to again try conclusions with their old-time foe.
   On the 19th a detail from the Eighty-fifth was engaged in gathering corn from a field on an island in the river some considerable distance above camp. After the corn was gathered it had to be brought across an arm of the river in boats to a point where it could be loaded into wagons. On the last trip one of the boats capsized, and Corporal Deford and Michael Rhoads, of Company F, were drowned.
   General Grant arrived on the 23rd, and his coming to Chattanooga was an event illustrating both his determination and his endurance. A short time previous his horse had fallen and so severely crippled him that he had to be lifted into and out of his saddle. Yet he made the difficult journey from Bridgeport to Chattanooga on horseback and almost alone. The distance was forty miles, over impassible roads, strewn with broken wagons, dead mules and infested at every turn with guerrillas – an awful journey for even a well man to make.
   Previous to General Grant’s arrival various plans for opening a line over which the starving men and animals might be supplied with food and forage had been prepared. These plans he examined the night of his arrival, and on the next day he examined the field; decided on one of the plans, and issued orders for its immediate execution. Before daylight on the 27th, within four days after Grant’s advent, Lookout valley was seized and occupied by General H. B. Hazen and a brigade of troops. Before noon a pontoon bridge was laid at Brown’s Ferry, a short road to Bridgeport opened and the all-absorbing question of supplies was solved. This brilliant feat of arms, so skillfully executed by General Hazen and his command, not only completely surprised the enemy, but won alike his admiration.*

*The Richmond Press, in describing this event, said: "The admirably conceived and perfectly executed coup at Brown’s Ferry, on the night of the 27th of October, had robbed the Confederacy of all its dearly earned advantages gained at Chickamauga."

It was no longer a question how long we could hold Chattanooga, but how long the enemy should be permitted to occupy Mission ridge and Lookout mountain, and the rebel banners wave defiance from their rugged heights.
   A few days before the opening of the short line to Bridgeport, and the practical ending of the siege, the rebel President appeared on Lookout mountain, and from "Pulpit Rock," as he looked down exultingly upon the beleaguered army, predicted its utter ruin. But not all of that brilliant group of Confederates seemed so sanguine of success. It is said that during this visit of exultation and prophecy, someone in the party of distinguished visitors remarked the beauty and grandeur of the scene, to which a cool headed officer replied, "Truly a fine scene," adding in an undertone, "but a damned poor prospect."
   William Tiery, of Company H, died at Nashville on August 12th; Albert J. Hamilton, of Company D, died October 11th, and John W. Snodgrass, of Company H, died at Chattanooga, October 8th.
     On the 6th Lieutenant Colonel James P. Walker was dismissed from the service, but his successor was not appointed until long afterward. On the 7th William W. Walker, first lieutenant of Company C, resigned and returned home, Second Lieutenant James M. Hamilton being promoted to first lieutenant. On the 27th Andrew F. J. Sharkey (Shackey), second lieutenant of Company E, resigned but the company was now too small to be entitled to three commissioned officers. Robert A. Bowman, first lieutenant of Company F, resigned on the 17th and Sergeant Andrew J. Mason was appointed his successor. On the 10th Edwin D. Lampett (Lampit Lampitt), second lieutenant of Company F, resigned, but no successor was appointed. David M. Holstead, captain of Company I, resigned on the 7th, and Second Lieutenant Albert O. Collins was promoted to be captain. On the 27th Albert P. Britt, second lieutenant of Company I, resigned and Private Preston C. Hudson was promoted to be his successor.

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