The Life and Times of
|
|
The Life and Times of
|
|
|
Chapter Six This being the biography of a single individual and not the history of the War of 1812, it is not necessary to give an account of the various small battles and skirmishes of those poorly conducted campaigns. It must be said that for the first two years things went badly. Along the Canadian frontier, where the fighting was done, a series of blunders and mishaps, often caused by contradictory orders and unseemly squabbles between the Secretary of War and his generals, brought discredit upon the country. There was very little military spirit; at one place the general failed his men, at another the men would not support their general; they were on most occasions far more inclined to lay down their arms, or to retreat, than to fight to the death like the men whom we remember. It was not until the sifting power of events had brought good men — Harrison, Winfield Scott, etc. — to the top that any success began. In the Southern department (which at first included North and South Carolina, Georgia, the lands west of them to the Mississippi, and the new State of Louisiana) the enemy for some time gave little trouble. General Pinckney did the best he could with the small forces at his command, garrisoning and fortifying all important places from the Virginia to the Florida line, except Port Royal entrance, which, weak from its own magnificent proportions, could not be fortified. The largest guns of that day could have done nothing for it. The Florida frontier General Pinckney esteemed his most dangerous quarter, expecting attack thence, but for a time there was an idea that Don Onis, the Spanish governor of Florida, might "cede" that province to the United States. Very soon after his return to Washington, Mr. Lowndes wrote to General Pinckney about this. This year Mrs. Lowndes accompanied her husband, having taken a house in Georgetown for the winter, so until the spring the letters to General Pinckney are the only ones that we have.
Mr. Lowndes's letters show how annoying these bids for popularity are to his simple, straightforward mind.
There are other letters much to the same effect. On January 16th he writes that the whole army bill has been carried, although " there were not half a dozen men who approved it. Every one was sensible, however, that to deny to the Executive the means which he thought necessary to carry on the war would be a measure of very doubtful propriety. . . . It was fortunate for the Administration, or at least for their wishes in this particular measure, that the opposition selected it as the occasion of a general discussion of the war, its causes, and the necessity for its continuance. The vote was by many considered a vote of approbation to the war, rather than to the measure." It may be as well to say at once that there were no important actions on the South Atlantic coast. The enemy did, as General Pinckney expected, attack Point Petre on the St. Mary's, sending fifteen hundred men in boats up the river for that purpose; but the fortifications were good, and the garrison, under an old Revolutionary officer, Major Messias, made so brave a show, that the English concluded that the post was too strong to be carried and withdrew. They also threatened the little town of Beaufort, some distance up the river above Port Royal; but there, too, the small force succeeded in daunting the enemy, who, believing its numbers much greater than they really were, retreated. The English, however, as they had done in the Revolution, entered Port Royal and the many unguarded inlets along the coast, and made predatory attacks on the coast plantations to the alarm of the inhabitants. Many allusions to these are in Mr. Lowndes's letters. The letters also show constant efforts to procure the cannon and arms and money for which General Pinckney asked, but apparently with very little success. Money was indeed becoming already a very serious question, and to this was due the debate about the merchants' bonds already mentioned. As early as November, 1812, Mr. Gallatin, the very able Secretary, looking about him with an empty treasury and no means of filling it, bethought himself of the large sums then at hand from a peculiar source. During the long negotiations prior to the declaration of war, America had said that if Great Britain would rescind her Orders in Council she would withdraw her Non-Importation Acts, and there should be peace and commerce between the countries. After long hesitation Great Britain did rescind the Orders: she might as well have done so long before, but one of her recent historians has whimsically said that "she overlooked the provocation that she gave." It was certainly not for want of being reminded of it that she did so, as the long diplomatic correspondence shows. Be that as it may, she did at last repeal them, and the merchants rushed into the market to buy and ship goods to America. It was not for American purchase only, but to be reshipped to those ports, " under French influence," where England herself could not trade. In the mean while, four days before the repeal of the orders, on the 19th of June, war had been formally declared at Washington. Not until September was the news received and an answering declaration proclaimed at London. For the intervening two months, richly laden vessels had been daily sent across the seas to the American ports. On arriving, the American acts being still in force, the goods were seized and sold. Five millions of dollars, and bonds worth eighteen millions more, were in charge of the treasury, but had not been confiscated, for the purchases had been made in good faith, and the matter had not been adjudicated. Mr. Gallatin now proposed that the government should, as a penalty, confiscate the five millions, seizing it as the fine due under the act. He sent this proposition to Langdon Cheves, the chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, to whose necessities it must have seemed like water in a thirsty land. The need was sore, the temptation great, and technically, perhaps, the plan was legal. But Mr. Cheves, though seeing the help that five millions would be to a depleted treasure, could not in conscience recommend it to the House. He was in the same predicament as the Military Committee mentioned in the last given letter. He stated the plan to the House, suggested that it should be referred back to the department, warned the House that it should not without extreme consideration put its hands into private pockets, and withheld all further advice. There was much difference of opinion. Gallatin, a just man, thought it a perfectly justifiable measure, and many agreed with him. Mr. Calhonn spoke strongly against the bill, and Mr. Lowndes is said to have done so also. I can find no mention of this speech in the " Abridged Debates," but Mr. Henry Adams (whom I have quoted before) says: "Lowndes fortified Calhouns position by showing, that if the plan of confiscation, and of a rigid execution of the law were dismissed, no just principles of policy, not even the interests of the treasury, could justify an exaction which would resolve itself into a tax.' " I have told this long story chiefly to be able to introduce the first of the many compliments which from this time forth were frequently paid to Mr. Lowndes by his fellow members in debate, which show the impression made by him upon his contemporaries. Mr. Grovenor, of New York, speaking March 2, 1813, says:
Finally a bill was sent down from the Senate remitting all
penalties on goods owned by Americans and shipped from England before
September the 15th, when the declaration of war was published
there. It was carried in the House by the votes of Cheves,
Lowndes, and Calhoun, who, voting with the Federalists, gave them the
narrow majority of three which turned the scale. To a strict party man it must have been bewildering ; but
the strength of these men lay largely in the fact that they were thinking,
not of their party, but of their country. To them it did not matter what a
policy was called, or by whom proposed, so that to their judgment it was
right. The sentiment was short-lived perhaps ; perhaps it could only have existed in the presence of a foreign foe, but it was beautiful while it lasted, " when none was for a party, and all were for the state." They had in them that pure element of enthusiasm which, not stopping to count the cost, or thinking of individual interest, insisted, as upon a right, on what was noble, just, and honest.
The bad news of the Chesapeake was but too true. The only satisfaction hitherto since the beginning of the war had been the naval victories; no one had expected to cope with England on the sea, and the elation was the greater for the surprise. When Lawrence, in the Hornet, captured the Peacock, men felt that the murders of the Chesapeake were avenged; unhappily, Lawrence, in the Bame ill-fated Chesapeake, went out to meet the Shannon, and met more than his match. The Chesapeake was, as the sailors say, "ill found," and the Shannon, under the gallant Broke, was in splendid fighting trim. Lawrence and many of his men were killed, and, in spite of his dying cry, which has become almost a proverb, the ship was given up. It was the first great reverse at sea, and a severe one, for there were so few frigates. I give a few sentences from the other letters of this session (1813), most of them on the danger of attacks by the English vessels already mentioned, and on the unnecessary talking in Congress, written with annoyance worthy of Carlyle.
A little later Mr. Lowndes writes : — I am very sorry that your mother has decided to spend the summer on the Island. I have thought hitherto that the objection to staying there was the danger of being frightened, rather than that of being hurt. But now I should not be surprised at the English landing on the Island. They seem to have adopted the plan of alarming us by debarkations, doubtless to prevent reinforcements being sent to the North as well as to increase the expense and unpopularity of the war. They have lately landed a considerable force in the neighborhood of Norfolk, and I really do not see why they might not land one near forts Moultrie or Johnson." These little invasions were doubtless annoying, but the blockade which the British had established from New York to Darien was still more so, and the " pocket pinch " was already beginning to be felt. Only the New England ports were open, for in order to foster the well known disaffection there, Boston, Salem, etc., were not only left free by Great Britain, but the West Indies were licensed to trade with them, as a reward for their friendship. By some curious process of reasoning, their merchants persuaded themselves that, as they thought the war unjust, they might "religiously and morally" give aid and comfort, and derive profit, by trading with the enemy. So they sent droves of cattle and wagons of provisions to the Canadian frontier, and victualed the British ships whenever they got a chance ; much as if in June, 1898, Florida had sent food to General Blanco, or supplied the fleet of Admiral Cervera. Their bias was yet more clearly shown by the notice which Decatur declared they gave of his movements to the enemy. Having put into the port of New London for repairs, he was kept there for months, for whenever he proposed to steal out, blue lights and other signals told the watchful Englishmen of his design, and he was forced to remain inactive. There was great reason to fear that Massachusetts and Connecticut would openly declare for England. From New York to Georgia, on the other hand, the blockade was strict. Planters and merchants could sell nothing; rice in Charleston and Savannah sold for three dollars a hundred, and cotton at nine cents a pound, while in Boston they brought twelve dollars, and twenty cents, respectively. Imports were the other way. Sugar was eighteen dollars at Boston and twenty-six at Baltimore. It was a matter of endurance for principle, and was borne patiently. To this state of things the Administration put on an embargo, primarily intended to check this treasonable trade, but in 1814 Calhoun brought in a bill to repeal it, embargoes and non-importation acts being against the Carolinian creed. It was better for the interests of the treasury that one part of the Union, at least, should be prosperous and have customs to pay, than that all should fail alike. Lowndes supported Calhoun's bill, and it was carried; but it brought them into opposition with the government, for Madison and his Cabinet had inherited the " commercial restriction " policy, and it went hard with them to give it up. Some of the devices resorted to at the South to help the poor to help themselves remind one of the efforts of the Irish ladies during the great famine, as the following taken from the " Charleston Courier:"
For the public service, and fortifications, too, money had to be raised, as this letter shows. " On reading your letter over I observe that you have determined to subscribe rather labour than produce or money. I believe that you have determined correctly, but I would much rather err on the side of liberality than of penuriousness, and if many people have subscribed produce, and my subscription of labour is not already among the most liberal, I should wish to add fifty barrels of rice to my subscription. If there be no peace, the rice, if I keep it, will be without value, and if there be peace, I hope we shall be able to get along without it." This letter, however, was not written until spring, and in January, 1814, Mr. Lowndes had the great pleasure of moving a vote of thanks and praise to many gallant sailors, living and dead. He was at this time chairman of the Naval Committee, and so had the right to present it, and the navy was always, as has been said, his dearest care. To Lawrence, thanks for the capture of the Peacock were mingled with mourning for his death on the Chesapeake, so quickly had the actions succeeded each other. Congress voted a gold medal to each of his surviving officers. Mr. Lowndes in support of this resolution said:
He spoke of each battle, and enumerated the officers concerned in it with care; dwelling peculiarly on the battle of Lake Erie by Perry, from which he hoped that the House would learn a lesson favorable to his great desire,—large ships and fleets. The other sea fights had been by single ships, but Commodore Perry's little fleet, built by himself from the forests around, had achieved so much, — the safety of northern New York, and the opportunity given to General Harrison to repulse the Indians without an English army in his rear, — that it was easy to point out the value of concerted action. He eloquently praised the courage and daring, and the " fertility of resource," which had changed almost certain defeat to victory, and concluded : " Captain Perry and his gallant associates have not only given us victory in one quarter, but shown us how to obtain it in another yet more important. How deep is now the impression on every mind that we want but ships to give our fleet on the Atlantic the success which has hitherto attended our single vessels. We want but ships. We want then but time. Never had a nation when first obliged to engage in the defense of naval rights by naval means, — never had such a nation the advantages or the success of ours. ... To such men we can do no honour. All records of the present time must be lost, history must be a fable or a blank, or their fame is secure. To the naval character of the country our votes can do no honour, but we may secure ourselves from the imputation of insensibility to its merit; we can at least express our admiration and our gratitude." Mr. Chase says of this speech that " it was received and read with enthusiasm in every part of the country," and that " it deserves especial attention from the extensive popularity that it gave to its author." The approbation, however, was not universal, for Mr. Quincy declared, speaking of the action of the Peacock and the Hornet: — " It is not becoming a moral and religious people to express any admiration of military or naval exploits which are not immediately connected with the defense of our seacoast or soil." To how many maritime leagues of distance should our fleets be limited? Soon after this Mrs. Lowndes joined her husband in Washington, and there are therefore no more letters to her to the end of the session. It may as well be said here that notwithstanding the fatigue of the long journey with three little children, the difficulties of housekeeping, etc., she enjoyed the Washington life on the whole. Besides the privilege of being with her husband and watching over his health, she liked the varied society. Mr. and Mrs. Monroe, whom she had known in her girlhood when
abroad with her father, received her most kindly, and introduced her at
once to all that was best. An exceedingly quiet and reserved person, she
yet took her part becomingly, and particularly liked the foreign element
which already began to give a cosmopolitan tone to " the capital." She
spoke French fluently, and Italian tolerably, accomplishments rarer then
and more esteemed than now, and this made her society agreeable to
strangers. With the wife of the French Minister, Madame la Baronne Hyde de
Neuf ville, a very charming woman, she became intimate, and corresponded
for years. A much greater aid and comfort was the friendship of Mrs.
Langdon Cheves, the wife of her husband's colleague and friend. Mrs.
Cheves, a woman whose great beauty adorned an admirable character, had
preceded Mrs. Lowndes in Washington by some years, and could give many
useful hints. The two Carolina ladies held together, as their husbands
did, to the same advantage, as their letters and notes testify. Now
sympathizing over domestic difficulties, now lamenting the pranks of their
schoolboys, now offering help in entertainments, and now planning to buy
together and divide "a bolt of nankin, which is cheap by the piece, and
will be a great help for the boys," viz. for their trousers. Mr. Calhoun
was another constant visitor, and Mrs. Lowndes would often in after years
point to an old brown volume of maps, and tell how Lowndes and Calhoun
would bend over it, eagerly debating where the roads and canals, for which
both longed, should go. There could be no doubt that good roads were a
military necessity, and Mr. Calhoun, as Secretary of War, had the question
at heart. Mr. Lowndes wished for them, too, as means of interstate
communication, particularly with the western country, " that the people
might know each other better and commerce be facilitated." Canals, too,
were discussed. For the rest of the session (winter and spring of 1814) Mr. Lowndes continued busy with the naval affairs. Mr. Chase (to whose careful research I am greatly indebted) says that " the bills passed under his influence at this session were laws in aid of the naval establishment and the general system of national defense; to authorize an increase of the marine corps, and the construction of floating batteries ; to allow rank to be bestowed on naval officers for distinguished conduct; to provide for the appointment of flotilla officers, for bounties for prisoners captured on the high seas and brought into port, and for pensions for the widows and children of those slain in action." A good amount of work for one session. By this time the American privateers were the terror of the seas. Light, swift schooners, they darted about like sea birds, pouncing on every English merchantman which came in their way, and doing, undoubtedly, great damage to the enemy's commerce. The country at large delighted in and prided itself upon them. But to privateering Mr. Lowndes was unalterably opposed; and as he had two years before, so now again he spoke and voted against it, though quite aware that he ran the risk of incurring much unpopularity by so doing. He admitted that the country had unusual facilities for this species of warfare, and might, or did, derive some immediate benefit from it; but he objected to putting into private hands what was, he thought, the duty of the government alone, viz. waging war and thereby increasing its horrors. No good, he thought, would in the long run result from a measure evil in itself. He failed to produce any effect, however, and it was reserved for another generation to approve his ideas. There are a few letters to General Pinckney, from which I give some extracts:
This letter refers to that Indian war in which General Jackson won his first laurels. The savages —incited by the English, who sent them arms, and bestowed upon their chief Hilishago the title of brigadier-general, together with a splendid uniform and a rifle, tomahawk, and scalping-knife, all emblazoned with the royal arms — burst upon the settlers in Tennessee and Georgia with their usual ferocity. Jackson marched upon them instantly, sending also to General Pinckney for aid. General Pinckney did all that the distances and the pathless state of the country permitted, sending the Georgia militia to his assistance, and following himself as fast as possible. He arrived only in time to see the victor sign with the red men the treaty of Fort Jackson, which ended hostilities for a time. It was after this that General Pinckney advised that his department should be divided, as altogether too large for one man's handling; and that the Southwest and Gulf coast should be made into a separate division, with General Jackson as its commander. The battle of New Orleans showed the excellence of the advice. The painful want of money alluded to was greatly caused by the hostility of the large cities to the Administration. They would make no loans, the banks protesting incapacity, and this led to the effort to form another United States Bank, which was to be the chief occupation of the coming session.
This was the repeal of the embargo already mentioned. Before Congress met again Washington had fallen,—perhaps the only instance of the capital of a country being taken by an enemy with hardly a blow struck in its defense. It is a curious story altogether, but does not belong here, — the moderation of the victors being perhaps the strangest part of it. It was rather a keen mortification than a crushing blow, for Washington did not then contain anything of irreparable value. The mortification seems to have stirred the army to greater efforts and from that time the tide of fortune began to turn; the first letter for the autumn session mentions a military success, the battle of Lundy's Lane. It also shows the feeling of insecurity about Washington which the event had caused, and the talk of removing the capital.
But as I have no great respect for his character, I do not condemn myself to be a very patient listener. ... I have not yet mentioned the articles which we left here [in the house which they had rented for a year, the previous session], but I believe that we have not lost much. Our house, like almost every other on the hill, has been very much injured, not by the English but by a severe storm the night after they were here. I think that I shall get rid of it by paying half the rent. ... I have not yet told you, I believe, that Mrs. Cheves is to stay at Philadelphia this winter. "Mr. Madison has been very ill, so ill that his recovery has been extraordinary. You have, I suppose, heard of General Brown's success. He has made a sortie, killed and taken about 800 men, and destroyed the works which the English had advanced against him, and which indeed endangered his army. On October 9th comes the first definite hope of peace. Commissioners from the United States and his Britannic Majesty had been named and accepted. Mr. Lowndes writes:
It is commonly supposed here that Lord Hill will attack either the Southern ports or Louisiana. At such a moment, to be absent from one's family is very painful. I cannot think that the English will attempt to maintain the seat of war in the Southern States. If they were to attack Charleston and take it, their European troops would suffer more in the first summer than from the severest European campaign, yet our calculation should be that they will attack it. We do not hear at this place a whisper of peace. If the
Administration think it in any degree probable, they keep the secret of
their opinions better than usual. It is, indeed, very important that our
exertions should not be weakened by the opinion that they may be
unnecessary. Yet the hope in which I sometimes indulge myself I cannot
refuse to communicate to you, but I must beg you to say nothing of it to
any one else.
The omitted portions of this and the other letters of this time are filled with anxious inquiries about crops, plantation work, overseers, etc., and the pressing question of ways and means. Mr. Lowndes's long absences, and the fact that his lands were liable to overflow from " freshets " in the river, had by this time begun to impair his fortune. Nowhere in the world is the master's eye more needed than on a rice plantation; few are the overseers who can supply the intelligent vigilance which the situation demands. Ellick had proved incapable of conducting matters on his own responsibility, and Mrs. Lowndes was worried by fears that, while remiss about his own work, he, being dressed in a little brief authority, was severe to the people. The white overseers were little better, and Mrs. Lowndes determined to remain at Jacksonborough (the village nearest to the Horse Shoe) throughout the summer, in hopes that her presence would serve at once as a check and a stimulus. There were difficulties, of health and a school for the boys, and Mr. Lowndes writes, " I hope if your sister [Mrs. Huger] should go to the Horse Shoe (or, indeed, if she should not), that you will have everything done to your gloomy residence which can make it more tolerable. I fear that while war lasts we can calculate in Carolina only on the comforts which are to be obtained without buying; but whatever you can obtain either by the labor of the negroes or by credit I earnestly wish you to obtain." And again —
Such were some of the troubles of a planter's wife. On November 30th Mr. Lowndes writes that the dispatches from Ghent are encouraging, and continues: —
This alludes to a passage in a recent letter, in which he says that the conversation at the " mess," turning entirely on politics, affords no relaxation from the labors of the day. He adds, " As to our own children, I am very anxious to know what you have done with them. If we have peace, I must spend next summer in the back country, and we shall therefore be as much at a loss about them in summer as in winter. It would not be easy to say what it is which recommends public life, and yet how few willingly quit it. I am sometimes surprised that I should have remained in it so long. Some men indeed want offices of honor or of profit, and three years ago I should have been glad of military employment. But at present I am sure that there is no office from that of President to an ensigncy or a collectorship which I would accept. I cannot retain the place of Member of Congress, then, from the hope of its leading to anything else, and yet I have not fully resolved to decline. I sent you, a day or two ago, a pamphlet containing the dispatches of our commissioners. There seems to be some difference of opinion on the prospects of peace which it opens. ... There are really in Congress (in both Houses, as I think) a good deal of zeal and of political courage. But although a vigorous system of policy may be adopted and pursued by the legislature, it must originate in the Cabinet. I have got too near the end of my paper to begin a political disquisition." Peace was really much nearer than they knew, but for the time the terrible want of money made the bank question almost the chief interest of the session. Writing to General Pinckney early in December, Mr. Lowndes says :
In such a condition of financial distress it was no wonder that the plan of a bank should be eagerly discussed. The difficulty, however, was that the first, the original United States Bank, established by Federalists, had undeniably failed. Would another, under Republican auspices, do better? No good Federalist could believe it. Mr. Dallas, the newly appointed Secretary of the Treasury, had a hard task before him, for money had to be raised in some way. The private banks paid no specie; would a public one, a Bank of the United States, do more? Would the public, through faith in and desire to help the government, receive its notes as specie ? If so, what amount of notes would it be safe to issue? Around these questions the discussion raged, painfully embittered by personal and by party feeling. Mr. Dallas proposed one scheme, Mr. Cal-houn another. Mr. Lowndes supported Mr. Calhoun's plan with some slight alteration. The speeches were long, and some violent, and curious things were said. The anti-war men considered the bank as an outcome of that iniquitous measure, and spoke accordingly. Mr. Law, of Connecticut, wailed over our " having struck the first blow in the dark, against the defenseless provinces of Canada, which resisted and repelled our attacks, and disgrace and mortification followed." He intimated that we richly deserved the punishment we met. Mr. Hanson, of Maryland, was even stronger in denunciation. He as a " moral man " rejoiced in the confusion of " those fell destroyers of its [the country's] rights, peace, safety, and honour, whose misdeeds have brought upon the people the suffering under which they smart, the burdens which force from them deep groans which are heard throughout the land. No man feels for the wicked authors of our affliction [the war members] a more thorough sovereign contempt than I do, and if it is said that in contributing to the relief and salvation of the country [by voting for the bank], I incidentally relieve them, I justify it by replying that even such men must be relieved in preference to certain national bankruptcy," etc. After this it is not surprising that Mr. Calhoun was at once upon his legs. His speech is not given in the " Abridged Debates," but is described as " energetic," and " the Speaker [Mr. Cheves] called both gentlemen repeatedly to order, and earnestly endeavored to prevent the introduction of personal matter into the debate." At length, after two months of speech-making, and innumerable votings, the bill was rejected. Another, much to the same effect, sent down by the Senate, was taken into consideration, with apparently no more hope of a satisfactory conclusion. At last, February 17, 1815, Mr. Lowndes moved to postpone the Senate bill indefinitely. " He made this motion not from any hostility to a National Bank, wishing, as he did, that a National Bank should be established, but because he wished it done at a time and under circumstances which would give the House opportunity to decide correctly on the subject. ... In the fragment of the session which now remains there would not be time to enter into a consideration of these points. . . . The new state of things which now presents itself ought to suggest a reason for postponement. Congress could not now establish a bank half so eligible, or half so durable, as it could at a future session." This motion, which was carried by a close vote of 74 to 73, was of course made in view of the fact that on that same day President Madison was to announce to the Senate, and two days afterward to the House, the conclusion of the treaty of peace and amity between the United States and his Britannic Majesty, which had been signed on the 24th of December, 1814, at Ghent, by the commissioners of both parties. The battle of New Orleans, the most important victory of the war, had been fought on the 15th of January, 1815, three weeks after the treaty had been signed, and a month before the news of it had been received at Washington. The English force had been the most important yet sent to America, and the apprehension had been great. On New Year's Day, 1815, Mr. Lowndes wrote to his wife:
About the same time he says on the same subject: " I should like my sons to be, one a good general, the other a good admiral. You will not agree in this wish, so I will change it: may they be both good men, a paternal benediction in the sense of which the fairy may share." The fairy was his little daughter, then five years old. After all this gloomy apprehension, victory and peace must have been an immense relief. There is no letter just after the battle, but he says:
The relief was great, greatest of all to Mr. Madison and his Cabinet, who felt themselves saved. The Hartford Convention with its inadmissible demands and thinly veiled threats of disunion could hurt them no more. There was at first some dissatisfaction at the absence of definite stipulations referred to above ; but it was hoped, and the hope has been happily fulfilled, that on those points time would bring just decisions. We now know, better perhaps than the afctors in that strife
ever knew, what had been gained by the war. By it America had earned the
respect of the world. Englishmen had learned that a Yankee frigate equaled
an English one. Frenchmen heard that a handful of men on a sandbank at the
mouth of the Mississippi had beaten back the proud English regiments
before which they themselves had recoiled in the peninsula. Best of all,
the people, when not blinded by hate or fanaticism, respected themselves,
felt themselves a nation. |
|
|
|
This is a FREE website.
Visit our main Genealogy
Trails History Group website at http://genealogytrails.com for much more
nationwide historical/genealogical data and access to our other state/county
websites
