Military News - Hamilton County, Tennessee - presented by Genealogy Trails

Five Railroad Bridges were burned in East Tennessee on Friday night last by the Union men, two on the Georgia State Road over Chickamauga Creek in Hamilton County, heretofore reported, one on the East Tennessee and Georgia Road, over the Hiawassee River in Bradley County, (five minutes after the guard passed through the whole bridge was in flames showing that combustibles were used) and two on the East Tennessee and Virginia Rail Road, one at Lick Creek in Green County and one over the Holston River in Sullivan County. The latter was referred to in dispatches as Lynchburg. The guard at Lick Creek were unarmed, overwhelmed, tied, carried away and kept till during the day on Saturday. Three men, since arrested, have been identified by the guard. The bridge over Holston river was not guarded, Sullivan County being strongly Southern in feeling.

The bridge over Holston river, at Strawberry Plains in Jefferson County, was fired, but put out by the people. The guard had one hand cut off and his skull fractured. The indications are that one of the incendiaries was killed.

A gentleman just from East Tennessee reports great excitement in that section. It was evidently a preconcerted plan. The loss is very heavy and causes much inconvenience and delay. Matters in East Tennessee are regarded as being in a very critical condition. Much anxiety is felt here for Gen Zollicofler and his command.

The campaign of the Army of the Cumberland will not be closed without a decisive and bloody struggle for the possession of Chattanooga and East Tennessee.

It is said that the Western and Atlantic Railroad is being worked to its full capacity in bringing reinforcements to General Bragg, and that the road from Chickamauga Station for eight miles south is lined with Rebel camps.

On Monday the enemy batteries on Lookout Mountain played vigorously on Hooker's camp, Moccasin Point and Chattanooga, but the fire was neither accurate nor effective, no damage being done. The strength of General Hooker's position, and the ease with him, have probably led the enemy to abandon their expected attack. Our batteries on Moccasin Point are said to have the Rebel camp in the Chattanooga Valley, on the east side of Lookout .Mountain in complete range.

A dispatch from Washington informs us that one-half of Lee's army has gone to Hanover Junction, in the direction of Richmond, and the other half has gone towards Lynchburg, with the view of

reinforcing the troops sent against Burnside, or covering their retreat in case of a repulse.

Washington dispatches renew the report that a part of Bragg's forces are moving upon Burnside, in East Tennessee, but there is nothing definite regarding the operations there.

The able editor of the Memphis Avalanche should not undertake to write history unless he knows more about.

He works himself up to a higher state of excitement than is at all necessary over the claim of certain northern newspapers that the great battle of Cbickamauga was a "drawn battle" and says:

It is not true at all that Gen. Rosencrans army was hurled "helter-skelter” across a river and cooped up there "to starve." It did not cross the river at all, but kept its headquarters in Chattanooga and held that place until two months later when the battle of Missionary Ridge was fought, and Gen. Bragg was defeated and driven back to the neighborhood of Dalton.

It is true that the union army lived for two months on short rations, but it was not starved, or at least it didn't fight like starved me, in the assault upon the confederate forces posted along Missionary Ridge.

No one will dispute that the confederate soldiers under Gen. Bragg did splendid fighting at the battle of Chickamauga, as they .did everywhere else. No one will dispute that whatever advantages may have been gained these two days, were in favor of the confederates, and but for the stubborn resistance made by the Fourteenth Army Corps, under Geo. Thomas, the union forces would have been hurled "helter-skelter" across the river, as the avalanche intimates it was; but this stubborn resistance saved the day and saved Chattanooga to the union troops.

For two days afterwards, the command in which the writer had the honor of serving, held its position along the base of lookout Mountain on the south side, and then on the morning of the third day marched leisurely into Chattanooga, in obedience to orders from headquarters, and without the slightest molestation from the confederates. The union troops did not hold the advanced position held at the beginning of the fight, and the confederates failed to drive the union forces across the Tennessee river and out of Chattanooga. Neither army accomplished what it meant to accomplish, and in this sense the battle of Chickamauga was certainly a "drawn battle."

But no man who fought on either side in that desperate and bloody battle will ever think for a single moment of depreciating the fighting qualities of the other side. The union troops will admit that the onslaught of the confederates upon their lines was characterized by courage never surpassed upon any of the world's great battle-fields, and the display of soldierly qualities that never have been and never will be surpassed. On the other hand the confederates will admit that none but soldiers of the very highest order of courage would have withstood at all the assaults made upon the union lines. No soldier who fought in that war on either side, and who did his duty as a soldier, will ever be found depreciating the soldierly qualities of those who fought on the other side.

And there are very few who care to make insidious comparisons of the fighting qualities of the two armies. Both armies were made up of fighting men, and those who did the fighting and know from experience whereof they speak, will not call in question this statement of fact.

The situation is cheerful. Every confidence prevails in our ability to hold our position and defeat the Yankees.

The enemy shelled us from a battery across the river, opposite Chattanooga, at 1 o'clock this afternoon. The firing was slow; our batteries responding. The firing ceased at half past 2 o'clock,
without injury. The enemy are in Knoxville. Our forces still hold Cumberland Gap. Burnside is reported crossing the mountains.

With the exception of a few shells thrown at our pontoons yesterday, nothing has occurred to break the monotony of this place.

The enemy seems quite active below this place, but no further indications of and attack. We are informed that no attack will be made here, but efforts will be made to flank us.

Two privates of the Fourth regulars and one of Rosecran's telegraph operators were captured at Running Water Bridge.

Personal

Brig. Gen. William Carroll is in Chattanooga. We are pleased to observe him in excellent good health, as gallant and genial as of old.

Walter G. Overton, late of the Louisville Cobrier and after-wards, of the Express, and more recently of a Yankee prison has arrived in Chattanooga.

Tom Grutchfield delighted a party of friends with a bowl of Egg Nog (out of pure Jamaica Rum) on Christmas Day. We have been ruminating over the reminiscence ever since, and conclude on mature deliberation that "our host" on that occasion was the "noblest Rum" on of them all!

Brigadier General Lyle, of Philadelphia, commanding a brigade of Pennsylvania Reserves, was killed in the battle of Fredericksburg.

General Hugh Ely, a prominent citizen of Baltimore county, Md., died a few days ago.

Among recent deaths of prominent citizens at the North, we notice the following: Henry E. Jackson, of Baltimore; Benjamin Adams, Louisville; and George Anderson, of Wheeling.

Andrew Wallace, a venerable citizen of Columbia, S. C. died in that city, last Sunday.

Miss Hetty Cary is under arrest in Baltimore for planting a Confederate flag in the presence of a New York regiment drilling in front of her father's residence.

It never rains but it pours. For the past twelve hours enough water has fallen apparently to float gun-boats without number. It does not interfere with the operations of my "grapevine concern" however. The wires which convey my important dispatches, do not course through an atmospheric charged with electricity. Through the head of this department, considers himself "lightning up a limb" so far as the procuring of starling intelligence is concerned.

I learn that every Yankee tent is struck, around Nashville, and packed in the baggage wagons. Moreover, a whisper reaches me, that the forward move of Rosecran's is but a feint, to conceal his retreat to the north of Cumberland River.

A friend at both of my elbows tells me, that the "inevitable John Morgan, left Murfreesboro, "on his last expedition, with the determination to enter the city of Louisville before he returned." So he set out with his "merrie men" for the Louisville Railroad, having for the past half year constituted himself the chief engineer of that highway of travel and "He stopped not for brake And he stopped not for food"
Until he came to Bacon Creek, and made a bonfire, to celebrate the new year, of that famous Bacon Creek Bridge. I hear that he is scouring the "blue grass region" like a "meteor flash", to the wonderment of the vandal invaders.

I learn through my friend the Rebel Banner, that Mrs. Braxton Bragg, lady of the Commanding General, reached Murfreesboro, last Friday evening.

The Yankees authorities of Nashville, have secured the services of a female virago, to search the ladies who endeavor to pass through their
lines.

"From January 1st, we shall publish a purely army newspaper. We have made arrangements for a new press, type, and all the paraphernalia incidental to a printing establishment, and with our enlarged facilities for obtaining Northern news and Southern exchanges, can promise our readers from that date and able dignified and interesting journal."

I have had an interesting conversation with the Hon. Mrs. Bruce, and Mrs. Judge Burnett of Ky., who lately went to Nashville en route for "the dark and bloody ground" and after several adventures were sent back "as examples" to Gen. Braxton Bragg, by Rosecrans. The story of
these ladies was truly interesting. They remained in the Rock City nearly forty eight hours, and after undergoing sundry examinations, wherein divers impertinent questions were asked, succeeded in reaching the point they started from after much fatigue, but no special mishap.

Rosecrans says he is going to stop the "free transit" of rebel ladies through his lines, he has said it, and sworn it, and washed down the oath with a brimming glass of lager.

The telegraph this morning adds but little to what was already known of, the great battle in Tennessee. There is some amplification of details, but we have no new light on what is the great and critical uncertainty of the story, the fate of Chattanooga.

If our victory ends with Chattanooga it is comparatively unimportant. We will have repulsed the enemy, but will leave him in possession of his stronghold in Tennessee and in occupation of his former lines.

We trust, however, that our victory is, not thus negative, and that it will prove something more than a. mere check to the enemy. The context of our own telegrams and the Northern accounts of the battle, alike, induce us to believe that our army had either got between the enemy, and Chattanooga or was in a position to compel the surrender of that place, and thus follow up and consummate its victory. Chattanooga is said to be one of the most defensible places on the continent; but if Rosecrans communications are cut and his rear threatened, as we have reason to suppose, he cannot hold this great Citadel of the West, and the splendid army that he marched from it is at the mercy of the victors who pursue it. Chattanooga taken, we shall regain the control of East Tennessee, reestablish the defense of Virginia, and shield anew the heart of the Confederacy.

The enemy's accounts of the recent battle are given in another column. There is the usual
Yankee equivocation, but the general conclusion is that Rosecrans has been badly beaten;
that the intelligence is “painful," and that the details are only likely to confirm and amplify
the sense of disaster... The combination of circumstances; the tone of the Yankee press, and
the imperfect suggestions of .the telegraph, all induce us to expect great consequences of the
battle in Tennessee. It may have changed the whole front of the war in the West, illuminated The prospects of the Confederacy, and in the estimation of the world be a sudden and Propitious novelty, in our fortunes.

The enemy's accounts of the recent battle are given in another column. There is the usual Yankee equivocation, but the general conclusion is that Rosecrans has been badly beaten; that the intelligence is “painful," and that the details are only likely to confirm and amplify the sense of disaster... The combination of circumstances; the tone of the Yankee press, and the imperfect suggestions of the telegraph, all induce us to expect great consequences of the Battle in Tennessee. It may have changed the whole front of the war in the West, illuminated The prospects of the Confederacy, and in the estimation of the world be a sudden and Propitious novelty, in our fortunes.

We are safe in concluding that we have won the greatest victory in the war if only justly completed and not left imperfect through inefficiency or omissions of our own.

Confederate General John Bell Hood pulls his battered army into Guntersville Alabama, but finds the Tennessee River difficult to cross. Plotting another attack against the Yankees, he continues traveling westward with his defeated army.

Hood's Army of Tennessee had been having a difficult time in the previous months. Hood became commander in July 1864 as the army was pinned inside of Atlanta by Union General William T. Sherman. Hood made a series of desperate attacks to drive the Yankees away, but failed and nearly destroyed his force.

After holding Sherman off for a month, Hood was forced to evacuate Atlanta to the south. After Union troops captured the city, Hood moved his force west and attacked Sherman's supply line, which ran from Chattanooga, Tennessee, 100 miles northwest of Atlanta.

On October 5, Union troops held off the Confederates at Allatoona, Georgia. Over the next two weeks, Hood did capture parts of Sherman's supply line and forced the Union general to move back toward Chattanooga to take on Hood. Hood hoped to draw Sherman into battle, but his own generals were unanimously opposed to such a move. A shocked Hood consented to their opinion, though, and he headed into Alabama before Sherman arrived.

Hood had no intention of retreating for long. Although his army was demoralized after Atlanta, Hood still hoped to draw Sherman from Georgia. Heplanned an invasion of Union-held Tennessee, where he hoped he could recapture Chattanooga and Nashville.

But now Hood, usually confident and determined, began to show signs of confusion and timidity. On October 22, Hood's army marched from Gadsden to Guntersville to cross the mighty Tennessee River. Unfortunately, Hood forgot to retrieve his army's pontoon bridge, which lay across the Coosa River in eastern Alabama. Hood's superior officer, General Pierre G.T. Beauregard, sent the bridge to Guntersville but arrived to find that the army was gone. Hood had continued west past Decatur
Alabama, before finally crossing the Tennessee at Courtland.

The move took the Rebels more than 50 miles out of their way and made a surprise attack on the state of Tennessee unlikely. When Hood did move into Tennessee, Sherman's force was ready and waiting.

In November and December, Hood nearly destroyed the remnants of his army at the Battles of Franklin and Nashville.

No more important movements have been made during the war, probably, than the marching into East Tennessee by Burnside and freeing the loyal thousands there, and the taking possession of Chattanooga by Rosecrans.

The direct benefit to our own side, as well as the direful loss to the rebels, can hardly be over estimated. The rebels themselves fully appreciated the importance of these movements, and frankly conferee it. They sensibly feel their loss already, and boldly assert, that unless they can regain the positions now occupied by Rosecrans and Burnside, all their fighting will have been in vain. Soon after the terrible battle of Chickamauga, or Chattanooga, the Richmond Whig said:

“We suppress exultation at the thought of what yet remains to be done, and the possibility of losing all that has been gained by failing to complete the work.

Situated as Rosecrans is, the victory that does not disperse or capture his whole army is a lost opportunity. If he is permitted to hold Chattanooga, then our victory will be without profit, and we have to mourn that so many brave men have died in vain, and chiefly that the gallant Hood has sealed his faith with his blood.

Rosecrans must not only be beaten in battle, but he must be destroyed or driven from East Tennessee, otherwise the battle has as well not been fought. If this stronghold is not wrenched from him now, it will hardly be hereafter. If he holds it, he holds a point d'appui from which he may at any moment strike at the very vitals of the Confederacy.

He holds a region pestilent with disaffection that needs only the presence of a Yankee army to ripen into full treason. He holds the country that must supply meat for our army, nitre for our powder mills, and coal and iron for many manufacturing establishments.

The possession of that country is of indispensable necessity to us; it is the prize for which Bragg is contending until he has won it; we can but rejoice with fear and trembling over what he has done. Should he win, it will e the super best achievement of the war.”

More than a month ago we urged upon our military authorities the importance of placing Chattanooga

in a complete state of defense, so that with comparatively small force it might be held against a large force of the enemy.

This was thought to be unnecessary, because it was anticipated that our armies would he in Kentucky or even beyond the Ohio. But events which are now occurring show that Chattanooga and the various mountain passes into East Tennessee ought to long since to have been so strongly fortified that with a much smaller force than that of the enemy we could hold East Tennessee.

The enemy are fully aware of the military importance of East Tennessee and of the state of our defenses here. There are men in this section who are ready to carry them all information in reference to the condition of the country and the military movements which are taking place here.

In our opinion the true policy for us to pursue is to fortify some Strong positions in our own country, so that if we are compelled by the superior numbers of the enemy to fall back, we may have some place to make a stand where we can counterbalance their superiority in numbers by our superior natural or artificial advantages of position.

We have never believed in the policy of invading the enemy’s country and leaving our own unprotected and exposed. If al the strong points in East Tennessee were once fortified, we might then advance with safety, and if compelled to retreat, we would so do with impunity.

East Tennessee, by its natural position and by its railroad connections, is of vast importance to the Southern Confederacy, and why so little attention has been paid to strengthening its defenses is to us a matter of astonishment. The energetic efforts of the Government could soon place East Tennessee in such a condition that all the forces could not make a successful invasion.

Here should be collected all our government stores and this should be made the great distributing point. If we should then be able to regain full possession of Middle Tennessee and to occupy Kentucky, our fortifications would do not injury; but if we should be under the necessity of abandoning Middle Tennessee temporarily, we would then have the means of making a safe retreat.

We have strong hopes that Middle Tennessee will never again be in the possession of the enemy, but it is well to prepare for adverse fortune before the danger becomes too imminent.

No one who is acquainted with the geographical position of East Tennessee but must see the great and pressing necessity of holding it against any and all odds. If the proper steps are taken in time there will be but little difficulty in retaining possession of East Tennessee with only a small portion of our forces, whilst the others are engaged in operations elsewhere.

Common sense as well as military science teaches us that well planned fortifications are of great advantage in repelling superior forces of the enemy, and those who have been disposed to decry the advantages of fortifying and strengthening our positions, show alike ignorance and stupidity.

The enemy are superior to us in numbers and resources, and to counterbalance this we have to rely upon the justice of our cause, self-sacrificing spirit of our people, and the natural advantages of our position. It always requires a much gr3ater force to invade than to defend a country. Whilst, in our judgment, we have not now, and never did have, sufficient strength to carry on a war of invasion, we have always been able, if the proper steps had been taken in time, to have successfully resisted the invasion of the enemy.

We are satisfied that Tennessee was lost last 6 year by gross blunders, and that such was also the case as to New Orleans. Had the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers been properly fortified early in the fall, we do not believe they would ever have been the position of the enemy, and had New Orleans been fortified and defended as Vicksburg was, it would not be in our hands. Whose fault it was we cannot say, but that there were miserable blunders we presume no one will now deny. Let us learn wisdom from the past, and whenever we take possession of any strong positions, so fortify them that we can hold them against any force of the enemy that may be brought against them. By the use of proper means East Tennessee can be made the Gibraltar of the Southern Confederacy. Will it be done?